Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Irenaeus, Philolaus and Gabriel M.A. Segal

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
No things would be clear to us as entity or relationships unless there existed Number and its essence [Philolaus]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
There is no falsehood in harmony and number, only in irrational things [Philolaus]
Harmony must pre-exist the cosmos, to bring the dissimilar sources together [Philolaus]
Everything must involve numbers, or it couldn't be thought about or known [Philolaus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
Existing things, and hence the Cosmos, are a mixture of the Limited and the Unlimited [Philolaus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
Self-created numbers make the universe stable [Philolaus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Philolaus was the first person to say the earth moves in a circle [Philolaus, by Diog. Laertius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Irenaeus says evil is necessary for perfect human development [Irenaeus, by Davies,B]